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Introduction 
In neoclassical economics, wage rates-like 
the price of any traded commodity-are  deter- 
mined by both supply and demand. Despite the 
simultaneous  nature of the wage-setting  process, 
recent empirical investigations of the determi- 
nants of wages have focused primarily on factors 
affecting labor supply Demand factors have 
been relatively neglected. 
During the 1940s and 1950s, participation in 
the administration of wage and price controls 
led a distinguished group of economists to 
examine employer wage policies. Reynolds, 
Segal, Dunlop, Myers, Lester, and Lewis studied 
interindustry,  intra-industry,  union, establish- 
ment size, and regional differentials.' In 
essence, they focused on variables controlled by 
employers (that is, labor demand) and medium- 
run labor supply Dunlop (1957) summarizes 
many of these effects in his work on wage 
contours. 
Research on the influence of supply-side  fac- 
tors was stimulated by the development of 
human capital theory (Becker [I9641 and Mincer 
[1974]), and by the availability of household 
1  Segal(1986) and Kerr (1983) summarize the work of these 
economists. 
surveys, which gather more information on 
workers than on their employers. Since the 
1960s, labor economists have primarily studied 
variables controlled by employees (that is, long- 
run labor supply factors)  such as age, education, 
and experience. 
In the Current Population Survey, a house- 
hold survey, regressions of wages on workers' 
characteristics typically produce results similar 
to those shown in table 1. In this example, the 
explanatory power of human capital variables is 
enhanced by exclusion of agricultural workers 
and of the youngest and oldest workers from the 
sample. Even within this limited population, the 
narrowly defined human capital variables 
explain only a quarter of the variation in the log 
of wages.2 Addition of occupation raises explan- 
atory power by 16 percent, while race, sex, and 
union variables add another 6 percent. Industry 
(broadly defined) raises explanatory power to 51 
percent of the variation of wages. 
what accounts for the 49 percent of wage 
variation that the equation doesn't explain? Are 
there other empirical regularities or theories that 
2 The explanatory power of human capital variables reported in 
table1 is actually relatively high compared to that found in many 




Best available copy8. Dalton and Ford  1970 U.S. Census sample 
(1  977) 
Authors and Year  Data  Relevant Conclusions 
7. Wachtel and Betsey  Survey of Consumer Finances (1967),  Residuals of human capital wage regres- 
(1  972)  Institute for Social Research sample of full-  sions (with age, sex, race, job tenure, 
time, full-year service and production  education, and marital status) are highly 
workers  correlated with industry-occupation, 
union status, city size, and region dum- 
mies. Conclude that these structural 
(demand-side)  variables, especially indus- 
try-occupation, are important determi- 
nants of wages because of rigidities in 
the labor market. 
Industry earnings increase with con- 
centration up to a ratio of 0.5, after 
which they are stable. Sex and race 
differentials are large and significant for 
high concentration industries, while 
industry growth rate affects wages only 
in the more competitive  industries. 
Regional differentials were significant 
but had changed since 1960. 
9. Pugel (1  980)  IRS profits by 3-digit industry merged with  Workers receive 7 percent to 14 percent 
industry average demographic and market  of total excess profits: some of which buys 
data  higher skills, the rest of which is rent. 
10. Krueger and Sum-  CPS, May  1974, 1979 and 1984; Quality of  Industry wage differentials do not disap- 
mers (1986a,b)  Employment Survey 1977  pear when controlling  for measured or 
unmeasured differences in human cap- 
ital or for compensating differentials. 
Consistent with efficiency-wage  models, 
lower turnover and better performance 
are apparently characteristic of high- 
wage industries. 
1  1. Dickens and Katz  Current Population Surveys -  all nonunion  Divided workers into 12 occupational 
(1986, 1987)  respondents for 1983  categories, calculated industry wage 
differentials in raw data, fixed effects 
equations (with human capital) and from 
residuals of human capital equations. 
Found that industry differentials are 
large, persistent, and correlated across 
occupations and countries. They are also 
correlated with industry characteristics: 
percent male, average education, quit 
rates, and measures of product market 
power and profitability Conclude that 
simple competitive models are not con- 
sistent with observed patterns. 
While evidence on the source(s)  of the differ- 
entials remains inconclusive, a strong link 
between industry differentials and industrial 
concentration (or profit rates) is found in all 
4 A further example of the complexity of the subject is that this  studies that search for it (Slichter, Garbarino, 
discussion assumes that most establishments  operate within a single  Reynolds and Taft,  and  Pugel, Ad 
industry and their wages reflect the patterns of the industry alone. This is  Dickens and Katz),  except Weiss. Krueger and 
a simplification that abstracts  from very real examples. For instance, drug 
shelf stockers in supermarkets are paid the low wages common to drug  find links between  and 
stores rather than higher supermarket rates. In these cases, even the  the predictions of efficiency  wage models (lower 
establishment is toohigh a level of aggregation.  turnover and higher effort) 
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Differentials 
Table 3 summarizes a selection of the empirical 
literature that provides evidence of the existence 
of large wage differentials among firms and 
among plants.5 The first studies are case studies, 
where many of the issues explored singly below 
are investigated for a single labor market. The 
first two studies are particularly valuable because 
they use data with unusually rich information on 
both worker and firm characteristics.  Both stud- 
ies find significant differentials among firms. 
Reynolds concludes that firms select the general 
wage level on which they operate until forced to 
change. Rees and Schultz estimate the individual 
and establishment effect on wages for four 
groups of occupations and find systematic dig 
ferences among firms that are not consistent 
across all occupations. 
Mackay, et al., Nolan and Brown, and Brown, 
et al. are fairly recent case studies of English and 
Australian labor markets. They find that wage 
variation by plant is a large and fundamental 
component of wage dispersion,  and that 
employer wage differences are persistent over 
time and are linked to plant performance. 
Like the English and Australian studies, 
Groshen (1988a) focuses on the entire employer 
differential within industry rather than on the 
portion associated with a particular charac- 
teristic. She finds that a random switch in 
employer, within detailed occupational category 
and industry, is associated with an expected 
wage change of 12 percent. She also finds that 
employer size, gender composition, and indus- 
try sector are associated with wage level. How- 
ever, it is unlikely that measures of human 
capital such as experience, tenure, or education 
explain the observed establishment differentials. 
Groshen (1988b) finds that these interemployer 
wage differences are virtually stationary over six 
years and present within a single metropolitan 
statistical area. Hodson matches U.S. household 
survey data with employer information and finds 
employer characteristics  to be strongly signifi- 
cant predictors of wages. 
Investigations of employer size and gender 
composition wage differentials, such as those 
listed in table 3, are a dimension of the work on 
employer differentials because they select one 
aspect of establishment differentials for examina- 
5 For a survey of the literature  and the empirical problems 
associated with measuring a related issue, the relationship  between 
compensation and firm performance,  see Ehrenberg and Milkovich 
(1987). 
tion. The explanations for these phenomena 
must also come from the theories explored 
below The worker-quality differential studies, 
by Evans and Conant, are of interest because 
they argue against sorting by ability or human 
capital. 
Finally, the last two intra-establishment  stud- 
ies suggest that although interoccupational dif- 
ferentials are compressed within establishments, 
they do have the same patterns. Thus, establish- 
ment effects are fairly, but not exactly, uniform 
across occupations. 
In summary, these studies provide strong 
evidence that within-occupation  interemployer 
differentials exist, and that they are associated 
with measurable attributes of employers, such as 
firm or plant size. 
II.  Sources of Wage 
Differentials  Among 
Employers 
This section summarizes five models that 
explain why an employer might pay a wage 
premium to all of its employees rather than to 
particular individuals. These theories are based 
on the rigorous models of particular economic 
relationships that have been developed since the 
1960s. Virtually all of the ideas in the following 
discussion can be found in the work of earlier 
economists, but were later formalized by, and 
are here referenced to, other authors. 
A.  The Role of 
Employers in the Basic 
Model of Wage 
Determination 
The point of departure for the models of em- 
ployer wage effects listed below is basic Mar- 
shallian supply and demand. I begin by noting 
that in a perfectly competitive labor market with 
costless contracting  and information, and with 
identical workers and jobs, no differentials 
based on differences in labor demand 
would arise. 
Market labor supply is a function of leisure 
preferences, population supply, and training 
costs. Market labor demand is the horizontal 
sum of all employers' demand curves, that is, the 
marginal revenue product of hours worked. 
Under perfect competition in capital and labor 
markets, equivalent workers at equivalent jobs 
earn the same wage. An employer whose wages 
stray from the market rate will be forced out of 
business by loss of employees (wages set too 
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CASE  STUDIES AND MORE  GENERAL STUDIES OF INTEREMPLOYER DIFFERENTIALS 
1. Reynolds (195  1)  Case study of an urban blue-collar labor  Plant wage-level depends on industry, 
market based on worker interviews  and data  unusual efficiency of plant or manage- 
published by other sources  ment, secure monopoly or oligopoly 
control of product market, and history 
of  relative wages. Most wage move- 
ments occur uniformly within clusters 
of firms. Plants operate within a range 
of  feasible wage rates, but movement 
within the band is difficult. 
2. Rees and Schultz  Personnel records from 75 Chicago establish-  Industry differentials vary in size and 
(1  970)  ments on 13 occupations, white- and blue-  sign across occupations,  and are smaller 
collar, skilled and unskilled; interviews with  for skilled workers. No positive relation- 
management personnel and workers  ship between establishment size and 
wages, within occupation, industry, 
location, and controlling for work char- 
acteristics. Location differentials are 
uniform across occupation. 
3. Mackay, et al. (1971)  Mean earnings and quit rates by occupation  Within occupation, inter-plant coeffi- 
from personnel records for blue-collar work-  cients of variation ranged from 16 
ers in 66 engineering plants in Birmingham  percent to 23 percent and rank order 
and Glasgow from 1959 to 1966.  correlations (from 1959 to 1966)  were 
about 0.9, except for laborers. Wages 
were negatively correlated with quits, 
but unrelated to changes in plant size. 
Investigations of  causes led to rejection 
of  sorting by human capital, of random 
variations, and of working conditions. 
Concluded that efficiency wages for 
quit rates and profit-sharing were most 
likely sources. 
4. Hodson (1  983)  Wisconsin 1975 survey of high-school gradu-  Corporate structure variables (size, 
ates from 1957,  matched with employer  international links, capital intensity) 
information  strongly affect wages. Product market 
variables (profits,  productivity)  have 
little impact. 
5. Nolan and Brown  10-year  survey of wage structure for seven  Employer effects on wage changes dom- 
(1983)  occupations in 25 factories in West Midlands,  inate occupation effects. Nevertheless, 
England  rankings by employer are relatively 
stable across occupation over 10 years; 
rank correlations of 0.8 to 0.9. 
6. Brown, et al. (1984)  Survey of 44 occupations in 198 plants in  Overawards to Australian workers tend 
Adelaide, Australia  to be tied to establishment rather than 
to occupation. Industrial concentration 
is highly correlated with size of 
overawards. 
7. Groshen (1988a)  BLS  Industry Wage Surveys of production  Within detailed job classification, 
workers' wages in six manufacturing  wage variation between establishments 
industries  accounts for 30-60  percent of wage 
variation, generating a standard 
deviation of  11 percent. Half of the 
differentials were associated with 
characteristics  of  the establishments 
(size, union affiliation, etc.). 
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8. Groshen (198813)  BLS  Area Wage Surveys of nonsupervisory  Within detailed job classification, 
workers' wages (blue-collar and white-collar)  wage variation between establishments 
in one SMSA  for six years  accounts for 20-70 percent of wage 
variation, generating a standard devia- 
tion of 12 percent. Differentials were 
unchanged over six years and not 
associated with growth or shrinkage. 
WORKER QUALITY DIFFERENTIALS, WITHIN OCCUPATION, BETWEEN ESTABLISHMENTS 
1  . Evans (1  960)  Private area wage and salary survey of  Across establishments,  the strongest 
clerical workers in Boston  observed relationship was between 
wages and length of service. Test 
scores and education are inconsistent 
predictors of wages. 
2. Conant (1  963)  Placement test scores and beginning salaries  Test scores accounted for only 10 per- 
for typists in Madison, WI  cent of the variation in starting wages 
offered by different employers to entry 
level typists. 
ESTABLISHMENT AND  FIRM SIZE DIFFERENTIALS 
1. Perlman (1940)  BLS  Establishment Surveys-Wages  and Hour  Hourly earnings are higher in large 
Statistics for six industries  firms, within industry, occupation, 
product group, and region. Hourly 
earnings are not affected by establish- 
ment size, holding region constant. 
2. Lester (1  967)  BLS  Industry Wage Survey and Census of  Except for textiles, apparel and aircraft, 
Manufactures  earnings increase with establishment 
size. Differentials increase when fringe 
benefits are included. 
3. Masters (1  969)  BLS  Census of Manufactures  Plant size variable is a stronger (larger 
and more significant)  determinant of 
average wage differences among indus- 
tries than concentration. 
4. Buckley (1  979)  BLS Area Wage Surveys for 29 areas  Controlling for industry mix, wages 
rise with area cost of living, but not 
with establishment size. 
5. Miller (1981)  BLS  Census of Manufactures  Controlling for industry, wages 
increase with size of establishment. 
6. Personick and Barsky  BLS  National Survey of  Professional,  Pay levels tend to increase with em- 
(1  982)  Technical, and Clerical Pay  1980  ployer size, but above-average levels are 
associated only with large firms. Wage 
premia attributable to a firm's size are 
larger for entry-level than for experi- 
enced professional workers. Corporate 
size has better explanatory power for 
professionals while establishment size 
does better for clerical workers. 
Both plant size and firm size are 
positively associated with wages, con- 
trolling for personal characteristics and 
concentration. The effect is propor- 
tionately larger when fringe benefits 
are included. Industry-plant  size inter- 
action variables were insignificant. 
7. Mellow (1  982)  Current Population Survey 1979 
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8. Dunn (1980,1984)  Independent surveys of employee wages,  Large firms pay higher wages and shift 
working conditions, and employer size  premia than small firms, except in the 
within one industry  highest-paid occupations. Compensat- 
ing differentials do not appear to be the 
cause; infers the presence of 
bargaining. 
9. Brown and Medoff  Variety of  public sources 
(1987) 
Firm and plant size are associated with 
higher wages, controlling for occupa- 
tion, industry, and working conditions. 
Differentials are smaller for higher- 
grade occupations. 
MALEIFEMALE COMPOSITION OF OCCUPATIONS WITHIN FIRMS 
1. Blau (1  977)  BLS Area Wage Surveys  Within occupation, establishments 
tend to be segregated by sex; pay rates 
are negatively associated with percent- 
age of establishment female. Occupa- 
tional segregation by sex is associated 
with industry 
INTRA-ESTABLISHMENT OCCUPATIONAL DIFFERENTIALS 
1. Ward (1  980)  BLS Area Wage Surveys 
2. Van Giezen (1982)  BLS Area and Industry Wage Surveys 
National occupational wage spreads do 
not exactly mirror individual firms; 
pay differentials are smaller within 
establishments. 
Area occupational differentials are 
larger than intra-firm differentials. 
Intra-firm differentials vary by industry 
and region, and decrease with estab- 
lishment size, although differences are 
small. 
low) or the loss of capital (wages set too high). 
The position that employers are price-takers 
is the theoretical basis for the current focus on 
labor supply as the only relevant determinant of 
wages. The employer in a competitive  labor 
market faces a horizontal labor supply curve, as 
shown in figure 1. In the figure, Employer 1  has 
labor demand curve D,, which differs from the 
labor demand curve of Employer 2 (labeled D,). 
However, because they face a flat labor supply 
curve (L,), the differences between the two 
employers affect only their employment levels 
(E, versus E,),  not their relative wages. Thus, 
the simple competitive model generates an 
empirically testable prediction: variations in 
labor demand should affect only quantity 
demanded, not wage level. This is true so long as 
demand differences do not affect worker utility 
The empirical work summarized above sug- 
gests that this simple model does not hold. 
Wages do  vary among employers. In order to 
extend the simple model to allow for apparent 
demand-side effects, any explanation of wage 
variation by employer must answer two crucial 
questions: (1) why would one employer choose 
to pay more than another, and (2) why don't 
high-wage employers go out of business? 
The answer to the first question is usually 
that a firm paying higher wages employs more 
productive workers. The advantage of the pro- 
ductivity explanation is that it also answers the 
second question. The disadvantage is that pro- 
ductivity differentials are usually due to individ- 
uals' abilities, not to employers characteristics, 
implying the need for more explanation. If prod- 
uctivity differentials are not invoked, costly 
information or imperfect competition in the pro- 
duct market must be present and, again, operate 
similarly on all individuals in an establishment. 
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Innate Differences, 
Human Capital, and 
Matching 
Wage 
EI  E,  Employment 
Source: Author. 
B.  Five Models of 
Employer Differentials 
Table 4 summarizes five microeconomic sources 
of wage variation. Each source is developed 
from the competitive model by the introduction 
of transaction costs andlor of heterogeneity 
among agents. The table also lists the basic 
assumptions beyond those of the competitive 
model, and the additional assumptions neces- 
sary for the models to predict the existence of 
apparent employer wage differentials, rather 
than differentials among individuals or among 
occupations. 
Each of the models examined predicts 
the existence of wage dispersion, and can be 
extended to predict employer-based dispersion, 
though the extensions usually involve extra 
twists of varying plausibility Although none of 
the five models relaxes the assumption of profit 
maximization on the part of employers,  they are 
arranged in order of their divergence from com- 
petitive theory in other aspects. In particular, the 
last two models, efficiency wages and bargain- 
ing, require assumptions of imperfections or 
lack of competition in the product or labor 
markets because they imply the existence of job 
rationing or queues for high-wage employers. 
The first two explanations relax the assumption 
of uniformity among workers or jobs in the 
market. Since the labor market is perfectly com- 
petitive, workers earn the marginal product of 
their work and employers pay equivalent wages 
per efficiency-unit of work. However, hourly 
wages may mismeasure either the workers' units 
of work (because this varies among workers) or 
their compensation (because it omits non- 
pecuniary returns to employment). In order to 
generate establishment differentials rather than 
just  individual differentials, the theories must 
also explain why the marginal product of work- 
ers varies among employers. 
Sorting models assume that some workers are 
more productive than others, and employers 
consistently hire their workers from a single 
quality stratum, regardless of occupation. The 
source of quality difference may be innate 
advantages (for example, genetic or moti- 
vational), or acquired differences (for example, 
education or work experience). Each establish- 
ment hires only the best, or only the worst, 
workers of each job category 
Aprzori, it is not obvious why an establish- 
ment would need or choose to segregate by 
ability If all workers were paid their marginal 
products, the number of workers paid to pro- 
duce a certain product should be irrelevant. 
For example, employers should be indifferent 
between two equally productive workers at one 
wage and a single doubly-productive  worker at 
twice the wage. Any establishment could have a 
distribution of productivity levels (all rewarded 
accordingly)  within each occupation. In this sort 
of world, no apparent establishment differentials 
would arise. 
In order for innate or acquired productivity 
differences to generate apparent establishment 
differentials,  employers must choose workers of 
fairly uniform productivity within occupations, 
and apply this policy similarly to all occupa- 
tions. That is, this theory must be combined 
with an explanation for segregation by firm. 
Two questions arise: why and how? 
The most convincing reason may be that 
employers' technologies are differentially sen- 
sitive to a worker's ability In this case, employ- 
ees of high ability who are not being rewarded 
for their higher ability by employers with ability- 
insensitive technology have an incentive to seek 
out employers who will pay according to ability 
This leads to a positive correlation between the 
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Best available copyability-sensitivity  of the employer's technology  For example, establishments requiring tech- 
and the average quality of their applicant pool.  nical typing are likely to be highly sensitive to 
Thus, employers with ability-sensitive  technolo-  the skills of typists. So, we expect such employ- 
gies hire disproportionately more high-ability  ers to reward an excellent technical typist more 
workers and, therefore, pay higher wages."  than would employers who needed only text 
Additional Assumptions Necessary 
Wage  Costly  Source(s) of  for Existence of 
Model  Equation1  Factor(s)  Heterogeneity  Employer Wage Effects 
SORTING BY  ABILITY 
Human Capital,  w=MP  Training  Innate or  Establishments differ systematically 
Innate Differences,  acquired worker  by average quality of workers, or 
Job Matching  quality,  match, consistently across all or 
quality of job  most occupations. 
match 
COMPENSATING DIFFERENTIALS 
Working Conditions,  w =  MP  Improvement  Management  Undesirable terms of employment 
Fringe Benefits,  of undesirable  strategies  are uniform across all or most 
Risk of Layoff  terms of  or technologies  occupations within establishment. 
employment 
RANDOM VARIATIONS 
Information, Search,  w =  MP +  6  Employer and/or Random draws  Employers vary in the average value 
Lagged Adjustment  c-f(0,a2)  worker search,  from the pool,  of their draws, employers hire 
job mobility  intertemporal  for all occupations during 
wage variation  growth surges. 
EFFICIENCY WAGES 
Monitoring, Turnover,  MP = f(w)--  Monitoring of  Management  Employers adopt similar strategies 
Market Insulation,  w * =  MP *  workers' effort,  strategies  (or technology has a similar effect) 
Corporate Consistenc):  turnover, design  or technologies,  on  the efficient wage across all or 
Morale, Loyalty  of internal wage  corporate size  most occupations, workers in most 
structure, firm-  occupations develop firm-specific 
specific training  training. 
BARGAINING 
InsiderIOutsider,  w =  MP +  Monitoring of  Varying rents,  Rent capture is achieved and/or 
Rent Capture,  f(a,workers'  workers and/or  ability of workers  shared by all or most occupations. 
Gain-Sharing  bargaining  of management  to capture 
power)  rents, and/or 
managerial 
altruism 
1  The symbols in this column are defined as: 
w=wage 
MP=marginal revenue product 
€=random  error term, distributed with mean of 0 and variance of  02 
f(*)=some  function of * 




Best available copytyping. The higher pay for skills will, in turn, 
attract other typists with technical skills into the 
applicant pools for employers needing technical 
typing. In order to create establishment differen- 
tials, this explanation must be expanded by the 
assumption that ability-sensitivity  in establish- 
ments is highly correlated across occupations. 
Otherwise, wage variation would occur pri- 
marily by occupation within establishment, not 
by establishment across all occupations. Thus, 
in the example, the need for technical typing 
must be associated with ability-sensitivity  in 
other occupations. 
The second explanation is not mutually 
exclusive with the first and could provide a 
rationale for the correlation in ability-sensitivity 
across occupations. This model assumes that 
variation in the quality of workers in an estab- 
lishment imposes negative externalities on the 
productivity of more able workers. Envision 
establishments as assembly lines where work 
stations are indivisible, or where the timing of 
the output depends on the speed of the slowest 
operative. Then, the productivity of the slowest 
worker determines the productivity of all the 
workers. As  workers seek their best-paying job, 
establishments become segregated by quality7 
Employers maximize profits by hiring or retain- 
ing (through their recruitment and termination 
policies) only those workers at least as able as 
those in their existing work force. 
Job matching provides another approach 
within the sorting models Uovanovic [1979]). 
Here, both worker and employer are unin- 
formed about the worker's productivity in a 
particular job, until both have experienced it. 
The productivity of a worker-job  combination is 
random, with a distribution known to both 
sides. Workers accept jobs that pay more than 
their current jobs. Employers offer wages based 
on the mean of the distribution, and later adjust 
wages to reflect measured productivity Accu- 
racy of productivity measurement improves as 
6 Models of  self.selection and sectoral choice where the sectors 
vary in returns to ability in a competitive labor market were introduced in 
Roy (1951). A more recent treatment appears in Lang and Dickens (1987). 
7 When an employer pays wages that reflect actual marginal 
product, workers will be paid the marginal product of the least-productive 
worker, rather than according to their own individual abilities. Workers 
with higher potential  will leave for jobs with a more productive "weakest 
link", causing average potential productivity to decline toward that of the 
least-productive  worker. Employers  who pay workers according to their 
potential marginal product will keep their workers, but lose money. This 
argument is similar to the "Jobs as Dam Sites" idea introduced in Akerlof 
(1981). 
tenure increases. Employees with bad matches 
eventually leave in hope of finding a better 
match elsewhere. Then differences in the dis- 
tribution of productivity across employers could 
lead to sorting.* 
Other explanations for sorting come from the 
sociology literature on the joint productivity of 
teams as a product of the uniformity of team 
members. In all versions, all employers (whether 
high- or 1ow:wage) earn zero or equal profits in 
equilibrium. But, high-wagelhigh-productivity 
employers are not associated with higher or 
lower profit levels than their low-wage1  low- 
productivity competitors. Only consistency 
matters. 
The human capital model, formalized by 
Becker (1964) and Mincer (1974), provides a 
rationale for the variance of wages according to 
acquired training. Training increases productiv- 
ity, raising the demand curve for hours of trained 
persons' time over that for untrained people. 
However, the costs of training, such as forgone 
wages and tuition, raise the supply curve for 
trained persons' time. Thus, the price of trained 
labor is higher than that of untrained labor and 
reflects the difference in marginal product 
between the two. 
If human capital differences are manifested as 
employer differentials,  employers must be able 
to predict productivity on the basis of acquired 
training (education and seniority), and both hire 
and pay workers accordingly High-wage employ- 
ers are such because they select the most highly 
trained workers in each occupational category 
Low-wage employers hire (or end up with) work- 
ers with the least training across the board.7 
Innate differences in productivity (for exam- 
ple, due to perseverance, or motivation) are less 
amenable to measurement by all parties, and are 
not included in the data bases generally available 
to economists. As  such, they can only be investi- 
gated indirectly However, if  these innate qualities 
8 For instance, suppose that all jobs had the same expected 
productivity,  but those offered by certain employers had a higher 
variance. In this case, the high-variance  employers might tend to have a 
high-wage,  more-productive  work force. This would happen because the 
workers with the good draws would stay longer and the workers with the 
worst draws would leave more quickly than they would in a firm with less 
variance. 
9 One explanation for sorting by establishment applies only to a 
particular form of  acquired human capital: work experience. High-wage 
establishments may be older and have a relatively old, experienced work 
force, compared to the younger, less-productive  workers in lowwage 
plants. If so, differences in age of  employer would be reflected in wages, 
although wage per efficiencyunit of work is identical for all employers. 
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acquired human capital such as age and experi- 
ence, then controls for measures of human 
capital also control for innate differences.1° 
Conant (1963),  Evans (1960),  and Groshen 
(1988a) all suggest that employer wage dif- 
ferences are not associated with sorting by 
measured human capital or by ability correlated 
with human capital. Gibbons and Katz (1987) 
suggest that the unmeasured ability explanation 
also faces a number of empirical problems in 
addition to high correlation in employer differ- 
entials across occupations. One problem is the 
lower quit rates in high-wage firms and indus- 
tries, which suggests that the high-wage jobs 
may be rationed, unless high ability has a partic- 
ularly strong association with a tendency for 
employment stability Another problem is that 
workers displaced from high-wage industries do 
not appear to retain their wage differentials if 
they switch industries. Finally, the correlation of 
employer wage differentials with product market 
power is difficult to explain within this model. 
2.  Compensating 
Differentials 
The second possibility is compensating differen- 
tials, described by Adam Smith (1776), refined 
by other economists since then, and summa- 
rized in Smith (1979).  The essential problem is 
mismeasurement of the total return to working. 
In the case of poor working conditions, mone- 
tary wage overstates the returns to individuals 
for their work because it ignores the extra costs 
imposed by working conditions. 
Working conditions vary among employers, 
and it is costly to improve them. All else equal, 
workers prefer jobs with safe or pleasant work- 
ing conditions to those with poor conditions. 
Thus, employers providing unfavorable condi- 
tions will be unable to meet their labor demand 
at the going wage. In response, the firms offer- 
ing undesirable jobs must improve the working 
conditions or raise wages, whichever costs less. 
If improvement of conditions is costly, wages 
will be higher in order to attract sufficient labor, 
but the profitability of each hour worked is 
higher because of money saved during each 
hour worked under poor conditions. 
If workers were identical, the wage differen- 
tial between any two jobs would ensure that 
10  Job market signalling (Spence 119731) is an extreme example of 
this type of correlation, which blurs the distinction between human 
capital and innate differences. 
workers were indifferent between the two. If 
workers varied in their tastes, the differ'ential 
would depend on the tastes of the marginal 
worker. The allocation of the work force among 
poor and good jobs depends on the assump- 
tions made about existing production technolo- 
gies. Technology is usually assumed exogenous, 
so we need a random distribution of differences 
in costs of improving conditions. If  technology 
is not exogenous, all firms will choose the one 
that maximizes profits, so only those combina- 
tions of technologies and compensating differen- 
tials that yield the maximum profits will coexist. 
In all versions of this model, employer (rather 
than individual) differentials arise only when 
quality of working conditions is consistent 
across all or most of the work force in establish- 
ments."  Many working conditions, such as 
physical exertion, do not apply because they are 
occupation-specific. However, high risk of layoff, 
poor ventilation, minimal fringe benefits, or 
inconvenient location could presumably affect 
all or most workers in an establishment. Then, 
the costs of improvement of these conditions 
must vary enough among employers to generate 
the large and persistent differentials. 
Empirical studies of compensating differen- 
tials have been notably unsuccessful in finding 
evidence of their contribution to wage disper- 
sion.12 One exception to this generalization is 
Eberts and Stone (1985),  who find evidence of 
compensating differentials only after controlling 
carefully for characteristics of employers, sug- 
gesting that compensating differentials are sec- 
ond-order effects. That is, type of employer 
determines overall level of compensation, but 
there is some substitution between wages and 
nonpecuniary compensation  within groups of 
otherwise similar employers. 
11  In addition, two fairly mechanical versions of compensating 
differentials are possible. The first is based on different age-earnings 
profiles with differing average tenure among plants. The second is 
variation in timing of annual salary adjustment. Groshen (1988a) presents 
evidence that suggests that neither of these possibilities is likely. 
12 For example, see Smith (1979). Most studies have attemoted to 
identify compensating differentials among industries, where conditions 
vary most among employers. Nevertheless, such inquiries have been 
marked by their lack of success. For working conditions, see Brown 
(1980); for layoff risk, see Topel (1984). It is also unlikely that employer 
wage differences compensate for differences in fringe benefits. Freeman 
(1981),  Smith and Ehrenberg (1981), and Atrostic (1983) find that inclusion 
of fringe benefits exaggerates  wage differences among employers. That 
is, high-wage employers pay even more of total compensation in the form 
of fringe benefits than do low-wage  employers. 
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Seminal articles by Stigler (1962)  and Rothschild 
and Stiglitz (1976) launched a family of pure 
information models that use costly job search to 
explain wage dispersion. Suppose search were 
expensive for job-seekers. In this case the mar- 
ketplace can sustain a range of wages because 
the gain from further search becomes uncertain, 
rather than a known quantity13 
In the typical model, establishments offer 
wages according to a distribution known to all 
job-seekers. Workers accept offers that exceed 
the expected value of further search.  Job-rejec- 
ters pay to search again. Thus, the only sustaina- 
ble distributions of wages are those where the 
minimum wage paid differs from the mean offer 
by less than the costs of employee search. 
These models focus on the role of the indi- 
vidual in wage determination. No rationale is 
offered for variations among employers.  A sym- 
metric formulation of the problem from the 
employers' point of view posits the existence of 
a known distribution of reservation wages 
among a population of potential employees. 
Employers interview applicants to ascertain 
their reservation wages, and jobs are offered to 
workers (at their individual reservation wages) 
when the expected value of the wage reduction 
from an additional interview by the employer 
falls below the employer's search costs. Em- 
ployer search costs consist mainly of advertising 
and interview expenses. 
The employee-cost/employer-distribution 
model provides no theoretical basis for the 
existence of employer differentials. Rather, it ex- 
plains only persistence of variance, leaving unan- 
swered the question of why the employers who 
pay over the mean do not reduce their wages. 
The converse model, the employer-cost/ 
employee-distribution model, abstracts from the 
fact that firms usually set wages for a job rather 
than for an individual. Indeed, wages are usually 
attached to jobs before the interviewing proc- 
ess. Exceptions to this rule occur where job 
responsibilities are not well-defined, such as in 
very small firms and for highly skilled or very 
senior employees. In general, two individuals 
who differed only in reservation wage would 
13 Originally, the information models were formulated to explain the 
existence of price or wage dispersion.  Subsequent work uses these ideas 
to predict the level of unemployment.  For example, see Azariadis (1983). 
Since the focus of the current work is wage dispersion, the earlier 
formulations of Stigler will be used to characterize the results of this 
diverse literature. Later versions of these models generate terminal wage 
distributions from initially assumed distributions. Stiglitz (1979) and 
Venables (1983) provide examples of these models. 
not be offered different wages at the same plant. 
Lagged adjustment, a second type of random 
variations model, is not inconsistent with the 
informationlsearch models, but provides a basis 
for the variations (wage shocks)  and an addi- 
tional reason for their persistence (internal 
adjustment costs).  These models, coined "geo- 
logical models" by Dunlop (1982a), focus on the 
employer. Establishments may tend to hire in 
surges rather than in steady flows. If the costs of 
redesigning an internal wage structure are high 
or if workers are immobile, a firm's internal 
pattern and general level of wages will reflect 
the market wage pattern of its most recent 
expansion.  l4 
In the random variation models, wages 
approximate the worker's marginal product, but 
costs of information introduce an error term. 
The mean of the error term is zero, and its 
variance is a positive function of the search and 
mobility costs for one or (perhaps) both parties. 
Consequently,  establishment differentials result 
from random variations in the average error 
terms of employers. But, if  establishment differ- 
entials are large, long-lived, and associated sys- 
tematically with characteristics of employers-as 
suggested by the empirical work cited above- 
they are not random variations. 
4.  Efficiency Wages 
Efficiency wage arguments posit a causal rela- 
tionship between the wage level and a worker's 
on-the-job productivity15 Efficiency wage 
employers maximize profits by paying workers 
a premium above the market-clearing  wage, 
because the resulting increment in productivity 
yields the highest profits. The increased produc- 
tivity has been modeled as coming from three 
W  14 For example, establishments may grow by the addition of a 
second or third shift, rather than by hiring a few new workers each 
month. Wages at the time of a hiring surge reflect current labor-market 
conditions. If the market is tight, wages paid to attract new employees will 
be relatively high. Later, when market wages fall, adjustment down to the 
new market-clearing  level will not be immediate. Redesigning the internal 
wage structure imposes costs (out-of-pocket  and morale) on the 
employer. Wage schedules are rarely adjusted more often than annually 
and are rarely adjusted downward nominally. Upward adjustments will be 
slow if workers face mobility costs. Thus, the internal pattern and general 
level of wages at any particular time reflects the market wage pattern of 
the employer's most recent expansion. (Hence, the term "geological.") 
15  The main versions of these models are summarized in Yellen 
(1984) and Stiglitz (1984). Efficiency  wages were originally formulated as 
an explanation for equilibrium unemployment,  rather than for wage 
dispersion. Wages do not fall to clear the market because firms maximize 
profits in a labor market where wages are high and jobs are rationed. 
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decreased turnover, and sociological considera- 
tions. The internal labor market literature adds 
two more possibilities: market insulation and 
corporate consistency 
In the monitoringlshirking version, workers' 
effort is costly to monitor (Bulow and Summers 
[1986], Shapiro and Stiglitz [1984]).  An increase 
in wages decreases a worker's incentive to shirk, 
because shirking increases the probability of 
losing a high-wage job. In comparison to an em- 
ployer paying the equilibrium wage, efficiency 
wage employers pay higher wages, experience 
higher worker productivity,  and have lower 
direct monitoring expenses. 
The turnover version emphasizes employer 
costs of hiring and training (Salop [1979]).  Wages 
above equilibrium reduce turnover because 
workers have fewer superior alternatives andlor 
because the general level of unemployment 
rises. Thus, workers paid higher wages have 
longer tenure. Two related searchtrecruiting  ver- 
sions of the model show that firms with high 
costs of unfilled vacancies will offer high wages 
to more quickly fill vacancies (Lang [I9871 and 
Montgomery [1987]).16 
A third variant of the argument is based on 
sociological morale, loyalty, or teamwork effects. 
Group work norms are raised by wages above 
the minimum required. Akerlof (1982) terms this 
the "partial gift exchange" model. 
The two internal labor-market  variants, as 
described by Doeringer and Piore (1971), focus 
on the out-ofpocket and morale costs of design- 
ing a compensation package for a group of 
employees, and on firm-specific  human capital. 
If  all wages are to be set constantly at market- 
clearing levels, shocks to the external labor 
market will necessitate periodic readjustments 
of internal pay relationships. Yet, redesign of 
wage schedules may be expensive for certain 
types of employers, especially large ones, or for 
certain groups of employees, such as incentive 
workers. In addition, any change in relative 
wage relationships may be perceived as inequita- 
ble or as a breach of implicit contract. Such 
dissatisfaction could reduce productivity 
through increased shirking or turnover. 
An alternative to frequent, disruptive adjust- 
ments in response to market fluctuations is to 
16 Lang (1987) extends the analysis to show that an equilibrium 
distribution of wages can be sustained among otherwise-identical  firms, 
but there is no reason to expect firms' positions in the distribution to 
persist, unless firms lock in their position by their choice of technology. 
This assumes the existence of  a range of technologies, each with 
different capital-intensity  (and, thus, cost of unfilled vacancy). 
set wages above the market level. If, on average, 
workers receive a premium, then wage shocks 
that are small relative to the premium will not 
force a firm to readjust its compensation pack- 
age. Employers save out-of-pocket  and produc- 
tivity costs of the adjustment, in return for 
paying higher wages. 
Corporate consistency the second internal 
labor-market  version, is based on the tendency 
of large firms to promote workers from within 
whenever possible rather than hire from outside. 
Presumably, firm-specific  human capital makes 
promotions or transfers among plants efficient. 
Nevertheless, such a policy requires that internal 
wages for each occupation in each plant meet 
two criteria: (1) they cannot be much lower than 
local wages for the occupation (or the workers 
will leave the firm),  and (2) they cannot be lower 
than firm-wide wages for that occupation (or 
workers will refuse transfers to the plant). This 
implies identical wage structures for each plant 
within the firm regardless of location, as long as 
product lines are similar enough for personnel 
to be transferred among them. Furthermore, 
each occupation will earn the maximum local 
rate over all plant locations. On average, this 
yields positive establishment differentials that 
increase with firm size. 
Efficiency-wage  models can be invoked to 
explain differentials among firms in two ways. 
First, the profit-maximizing  point is, almost by 
definition, locally flat. This implies the existence 
of a plane of (almost)  iso-profit wage-productiv- 
ity points for identical firms. That is, variations 
in wages from the optimum lead to only small 
profit losses. Firms are close to indifferent 
among the possible combinations,  so a random 
distribution of strategies results (Bulow and 
Summers [1986]). 
A second, more plausible, explanation stems 
from economically important heterogeneity 
among employers: differences in technology 
(vintage  effects, for example), or differences in 
products (such as differentiated quality niches). 
The productivity of workers at the market- 
clearing wage may be indistinguishable  from 
high-productivity work under some technolo- 
gies, or may be adequate for one market but not 
for another. Workers paid the market-clearing 
wage form a queue for jobs at the elevated wage, 
while recipients of the high wage avoid job loss 
or job changes because of the scarcity of equiv- 
alent opportunities. 
Efficiency differentials can explain establish- 
ment differentials when workers in all or most 
occupations in the establishment are affected. 
That is, it is crucial that the heterogeneity 
among employers affect the efficient wage for all 
http://clevelandfed.org/research/review/
1988 Q 1
Best available copyoccupations similarly The plausibility of this 
assumption depends on the version of the 
model in question. 
Few empirical tests of efficiency wage models 
have been performed, primarily because of the 
lack of appropriate data. One recent exception, 
Leonard (1987),  finds little evidence to support 
the turnover or supervisory-intensity versions 
among electronics companies in California. 
Another study, Krueger and Summers (1986a) 
finds some support for efficiency wage explana- 
tions of interindustry wage differentials. Interest 
in these models suggests that the results of other 
tests may be available shortly 
When bargaining between workers and their 
employers takes place in the context of com- 
petitive markets (in labor, capital, and products), 
bargained wages cannot differ from the market- 
clearing wage. Otherwise, the firm would close 
or the workers would leave. However, if  employ- 
ees can exercise a claim on the rents generated 
by an enterprise, they will bargain (implicitly or 
explicitly) with their employers. Wage settle- 
ments will reflect both the size of rents and the 
relative bargaining power of the parties. Thus, 
the existence of both rents to the firm and 
employee bargaining power are necessary con- 
ditions for wage bargaining to produce wage 
variation. 
Although all versions of bargaining models 
must assume the existence of rents, the models 
differ in the identity of the bargaining agents and 
in the enforcement mechanisms for the bargain- 
ing. The bargaining agent for the workers is 
most clear in the case of unionism. In the 
collective bargaining literature, the outcome of 
negotiation is likened to the Edgeworth Box. 
Bargaining is a positive-sum game until the 
contract curve is reached, and a zero-sum game 
along the contract curve. The outcome is deter- 
mined by the relative bargaining ability and 
credibility of participants' threats. The range of 
possible wages is bounded by the market-clear- 
ing wage on the bottom end and by the worker's 
actual marginal product (with labor appropriat- 
ing all rents and capital earning the normal rate 
of return) on the high end. 
In a nonunion setting, the bargaining agent 
for the workers is not obvious. However, econo- 
mists have long noted the existence of informal 
organization by workers in nonunion settings 
(Dunlop [1957]).  One version is the union-threat 
effect, where the threat of unionization forces 
owners to provide nonunion workers benefits 
similar to those they would receive if unionized 
(Dickens [1986]). 
In a second version, the managerial-cap- 
italism or agency-cost  version, managers act as 
mediators between labor and the owners of 
capital. If  the rewards to management are not 
highly correlated with rents to the owners, or if 
managers maximize a utility function dependent 
on worker satisfaction (whether due to manage- 
rial altruism or to the ability of workers to 
impose on-the-job  problems),  then management 
may not act to maximize rents to owners. 
Implicit bargaining may occur, with manage- 
ment cast in various roles from agent for the 
workers, to mediator between the two sets of 
interests, to agent for the owners. The latter role 
would generate a model all but institutionally 
indistinguishable  from a union bargaining 
model. For example,  Aoki (1984) presents coop- 
erative bargaining models for modern nonunion 
corporate enterprises with various constituen- 
cies. Edwards (1979) also presents an informal 
model of nonunion bargaining. 
Bargaining models easily lend themselves to 
the prediction of establishment differentials.  The 
only additional assumption necessary is one that 
binds together workers of different occupations 
in the establishment. Three possibilities exist. 
First, workers' bargaining power may be consis- 
tent across occupations in an establishment. 
Second, perhaps workers must form large 
groups in order to exert bargaining power. 
Third, managerial altruism may extend uni- 
formly across occupations. 
The persistent link between measures of 
product-market power and industry wage differ- 
entials provides an empirical basis for further 
investigation of bargaining theories. More direct 
evidence is limited by the lack of data, but 
studies by Abowd (1985) on unionized firms and 
by Kleiner and Boullion (1987) on both union 
and nonunion firms provide some support for 
bargaining hypotheses.'7  As  with efficiency 
wage models, more direct tests of these models 
are certain to be available in the near future. 
17 Abowd (1985)finds evidence that union contract settlements 
diminish the value of the firm by exactly the change in the value of the 
negotiated settlement. Kleiner and Boullion (1987) find that firms' wages 
are strongly positively correlated with the provision of sensitive financial 
information  to employees. 
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and Employer 
Wage Effects 
The empirical work cited in this paper suggests 
that employer wage differentials are large. Thus, 
they may account for many of the observed 
inequalities in the labor market, such as those 
among races or between men and women. 
Exploration of five models of employer differen- 
tials clarifies the point that these differentials are 
not necessarily inconsistent with profit max- 
imization by firms acting in a competitive labor 
market. Yet  each model suggests the existence of 
a particular barrier that prevents formation of a 
single market wage. 
The link between theories of employer wage 
effects and labor market policy to reduce 
income inequality is labor-market segmenta- 
tion.I8 When labor markets are segmented, 
workers are separated into distinct markets by 
institutional barriers that prevent workers or 
employers from switching between markets. 
Thus, different wages persist for each sector of 
the labor market. Although workers in each 
sector are paid their marginal product, produc- 
tivity varies between sectors according to sector- 
specific supply and demand, or sector-specific 
quality Obviously; the costs of barrier removal 
must be high enough to prevent profit-seeking 
employers from eroding the differences 
between sectors. 
Employer differentials will create segmented 
markets only if employers limit their recruit- 
ment to one sector, so any model must explain 
why employers hire all (or most) of their employ- 
ees from the same market sector. Each model 
discussed above introduces a barrier that could 
create segmentation, with strikingly different 
policy implications. Thus, it is precisely the 
identification of the source of the barrier that 
makes segmentation difficult to cure with policy 
For example, under the sorting model, seg- 
mentation will arise if workers of different sex or 
race have different access to human capital. The 
model implies a need for the development of 
human capital among secondary sector workers 
(for example, lower cost, better education, or 
job training).  Alternatively, compensating  differ- 
entials imply no role for policy; since the market 
actually remunerates all workers equally Appar- 
ent segmentation arises simply because tastes 
18  For a summary of the literature  on segmentation, see Gain (1976) 
and Dickens and Lang (1985). Lang and Dickens (1987) provide a detailed 
investigation of the relationship between the literature on segmented 
markets and neoclassical  economic theory. 
differ systematicall~7  among groups.l"andom 
variations suggests that search costs are higher 
for the classes of workers in predominantly low- 
wage jobs. A possible solution may be expansion 
of job-service agencies targeted to these groups. 
Efficiency wages and bargaining imply the 
existence of queues of workers for high-wage 
jobs. Thus, any attempt to reduce inequality 
should rest on regulation of employers' recruit- 
ment policies, on improvement of placement 
services for secondary market workers, and on 
elimination of any minor productivity deficien- 
cies among workers in the secondary 
These five theories of wage determination 
also diverge from each other in their predictions 
for the impact of other kinds of policy For 
example, Stiglitz (1984) and Bulow and Summers 
(1986) analyze the effects of efficiency wages on 
macroeconomic performance and trade policy 
Weitzman (1986) offers an analysis of the effects 
of a particular form of profit-sharing on eco- 
nomic stability and growth. 
Understanding the source of employer differ- 
entials is clearly important for understanding the 
distribution of wages, and for formulating policy 
to affect it. New sources of data must be devel- 
oped to allow research on employer activities 
such as supervision,  recruitment, terminations, 
and wage-setting.  Without further research on 
these topics, we will remain unable to sort out 
whether employer wage differentials are signs of 
inefficiency, of discrimination, or of other mar- 
ket imperfections. 
1  19  For instance, compared to men, women may prefer quieter, 
cleaner, or more flexible jobs (Filer [1983]). 
20 Bulow and Summers (1986) demonstrate how efficiency wages 
may be a source of market segmentation. They emphasize that 
segmentation requires the existence of a small productivity differential 
between workers of the two sectors, but that the wage difference between 
the two sectors will be far greater than the productivity difference. A 
similar argument can be made for differentials associated with rent- 
sharing, assuming profit maximization on the part of employers. 
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